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Politicians world-wide frequently promise a better life for their citizens. We find that the probability that a
country will increase its per capita GDP (gdp) rank within a decade follows an exponential distribution with
decay constant l5 0.12. We use the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and the Global Competitiveness
Index (GCI) and find that the distribution of change in CPI (GCI) rank follows exponential functions with
approximately the same exponent as l, suggesting that the dynamics of gdp, CPI, and GCI may share the
same origin. Using theGCI, we develop a newmeasure, whichwe call relative competitiveness, to evaluate an
economy’s competitiveness relative to its gdp. For all European and EU countries during the 2008–2011
economic downturn we find that the drop in gdp in more competitve countries relative to gdp was
substantially smaller than in relatively less competitive countries, which is valuable information for
policymakers.
A
n economy’s competitiveness is defined as the set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine the
economy’s level of productivity1. The level of productivity determines the rates of return obtained by
investments in the economy, which in turn determines the economy’s growth rate1–8.
Why does competitiveness in some nations increase more rapidly than in other nations?Why do some nations
seem unconcerned about improving their competitiveness, even though increasing competitiveness attracts
investment thus increases wealth? Whether poor countries will be able to catch up to rich countries has been a
question for many years, and the varying conclusions drawn have depended on the approach taken, e.g., how
many countries are involved or whether size dependence is taken into consideration7–13. Here we ask what is the
probability that a poor country can become a rich country within a given time period, e.g., within a decade? How
are the dynamics of competitiveness and the dynamics of a country’s wealth related?
We focus on both static and dynamic aspects of competitiveness1 by examining the per capita Gross Domestic
Product (GDP)14, denoted as gdp, and the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) (see Methods), which quantifies
the institutions, policies, and factors that control economic prosperity1,15. First we quantify the relationship
between the gdp and the GCI. Then we introduce a new measure to assess the competitiveness relative to gdp
as the differenceD between the actual GCI value and the expected value of GCI obtained from the power-law fit
between GCI and gdp—themore negative isD, the smaller will be the relative competitiveness of a given country.
We examine how the level of competitiveness affects the dynamics of a country’s wealth during a recession,
finding that during the 2008–2011 period EU countries with positiveD values experienced a significantly smaller
drop in gdp than countries with negative D values. The probability that a country will increase its wealth—
quantified by its rank within a decade—follows an exponential distribution. We relate this probability to the
probability of change in GCI rank, and our results are consistent with the interesting possibility that the dynamics
of gdp and the dynamics of GCI may share the same origin.
Results
Competitiveness versus growth. Over the past decade, countries such as Switzerland, Singapore, the Nordic
countries, and the USA have been considered to be the most competitive. Generally speaking, rich countries are
considered to be more competitive than poor countries, implying that there is a functional dependence between
GCI and gdp. Here we address two questions: (i)What is the expected level of competitiveness for a country with a
given level of wealth? (ii)What is the probability that a country will substantially improve its wealth and its level of
competitiveness?
Addressing question (i), Figs. 1(a) and 1(b) show plots of GCI versus gdp, both worldwide and for different
European countries. We find a positive functional dependence between GCI and gdp, which we fit with a power law,
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GCI! gdpð Þa ð1Þ
with exponent a < 0.1. Figure 1(b) shows that Germany is more
competitive than Estonia, but that is to be expected since the
German gdp is much larger than the Estonian gdp. But is Germany
more competitive with its peer countries—those with a comparable
gdp—than Estonia with its peer countries? When comparing competi-
tiveness relative to gdp, how do we estimate which countries are better
performers and which are worse? In addressing this question, note
that the power-law dependence in Fig. 1(b) indicates the expected level
of competitiveness for a given level of country wealth. When a country
appears above the fitting line, its level of competitiveness relative to
gdp is greater than expected for a country with its given wealth level,
quantified by gdp. In contrast, countries below the fitting line are less
competitive than expected for a country with its given wealth level.
This information is valuable for investors who need to assess which
countries with comparable gdp values to choose for investment oppor-
tunities. For example, Fig. 1(b) shows that Poland is more competitive
than Croatia, which we would expect since these two countries have
similar gdp, but the Polish GCI is higher than the Croatian GCI.
The regression we obtain also allows us to compare the relative
levels of competitiveness between two countries that belong to two
different wealth brackets. To this end, we introduce a measure to
assess relative competitiveness
D: ln GCIð Þ{ ln GCIð Þh i, ð2Þ
i.e., the difference between the actual GCI value and the expected
value of GCI obtained from the power-law fitting line. For countries
below the power-law regression line, themore negative the difference
D, the smaller the relative competitiveness. Figure 1(b) shows that
Greece is the least competitive in relative terms among all the
European countries, since Greece has the most negativeD. Note that
Norway seems to be an outlier among the Nordic countries, but
Norway is a huge exporter of oil and thus perhaps does not need
to be competitive. Thus for a country below the regression line (see
Spain), Fig. 1 suggests (a) the expected level of competitiveness a
country should aspire to in order to achieve at least the average
relative competitiveness (the vertical line), and (b) where the country
may end up if it does not improve its competitiveness (the horizontal
line toward the left).
For Latin American countries Fig. 1(c) shows a power law for the
GCI versus gdp with an exponent a 5 0.09 6 0.02, a value virtually
identical to l found for the entire world and for the European coun-
tries, implying universality in the regression of Eq. (1). Note that the
country with the lowest GCI value, Venezuela, is a huge exporter of
oil.
Up to this point no temporal dependence has been included (year
2011), and we have used a ‘‘static’’ approach in assessing levels of
competitiveness. Figure 1 suggests that, in order to become a rich
country, an initially poor country must improve its competitiveness,
but a static approach does not tell us how quickly this can be
achieved. In order to demonstrate the benefit of having a more com-
petitive economy, we use a ‘‘dynamic’’ approach to focus on eco-
nomic growth during recession years. We focus on recession years
because during good years even countries with weak growth policies,
e.g., countries that use massive indebtedness to increase their GDP,
may experience economic expansion.
In order to test how the level of competitiveness affects the
dynamics of a country’s wealth during an economic downturn, we
divide the European countries into two subsets: (i) countries with
better than average relative competitiveness, for which D defined in
Eq. (2) is positive, and (ii) countries with less than average relative
competitiveness, for which D is negative. We apply the statistic for
the difference between means and find that during the 2008–2011
period, countries with a positiveD experienced a smaller drop in gdp
than countries with a negative D, where the t-statistic yields 2.57 (df
5 40) suggesting that the difference between these two groups is
significant. Figure 2 shows the gdp growth rate vs. D defined in Eq.
(2) for each of the European countries. Note that it is clearly advant-
ageous to be better than average. For the regression line we obtain a
slope of 0.54 6 0.20. For the EU countries, including Croatia, during
Figure 1 | Relative competitiveness measured by GCI versus GDP per
capita (gdp) for (a) World, (b) European and (c) Latin American
countries. Above (below) the power-law fitting line, the level of
competitiveness is more (less) than we expect for the given country wealth,
quantified by gdp. In (b) Israel is shown, but does not contribute to the
fitting line.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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the 2008–2011 period, the gdp growth rate vs.D yields a slope of 0.35
6 0.17.
Addressing question (ii), policymakers need to be able to estimate
the probability that a country will improve its wealth position within
the next 10 years—e.g., will move from ‘‘developing’’ to ‘‘developed’’
status. The long-range data show that only a few countries, e.g.,
Singapore and the Republic of Korea, have been able to move from
undeveloped to highly developed during a period of only a few de-
cades. Such an occurrence can be justifiably classified a rare event.
Howprobable is it that a poor country such as Peruwill become a rich
country like the USA within a decade? For both academics and
policymakers, quantifying that probability is a problem that deserves
much attention.
To determine this probability we apply Zipf ranking16–21 to gdp
over the 32-year period 1980–201114. For each year t we rank gdp for
an unchanging group of 137 countries from poorest to richest. The
smaller the rank Ri, the larger the gdp, implying that the decrease in
rank, DR , 0, corresponds to an improvement in country wealth.
Using overlapping windows for each initial year t we calculate the
change in rank, DR, for each country over a decade, from t to t 1 10.
Figure 3 shows that the probability distribution function (pdf) that a
randomly chosen country will increase its wealth—quantified by its
rank—within a decade follows a double exponential distribution
P DRð Þ~l=2 exp {l DRj jð Þ, ð3Þ
with decay constant l ; N/SijDRij 5 0.12 obtained by applying a
maximum likelihood, which provides useful information for policy-
makers. Note that the left and right tails in Fig. 3 correspond to
countries whose wealth improves or worsens, respectively. To estim-
ate the probability that Bulgaria’s gdpwill reach Germany’s gdp in 10
years, we calculateDR—the difference between the current Bulgarian
rank and German rank—and, using Fig. 3 and Eq. (3), we determine
the probability 0.5 exp(2ljDRj) that at least a change in rankDRwill
occur within 10 years.
We begin by assuming that there is a relationship between the
competitiveness and the economic growth of a given country. To
explain why the probability that the wealth ranking of a country will
substantially change over a decade is low, we study the probability
that GCI values will change over the same period. Because we
lack GCI data over the 10-year period, we study a pdf of changes
in GCI rank for 124 countries during the 6-year period 2005–2011.
Although we use GCI data for a period that differs from the one we
used in Fig. 3, Fig. 4(a) shows the pdf of changes in GCI rank with an
exponent similar to the one in Fig. 3, implying that the dynamics of
gdp and the dynamics of GCImay share the same origin.We approx-
imate the pdf with an exponential function obtained by using a
maximum likelihood approach. Because the GCI value for any given
country includes the corruption level of that country, it is reasonable
to assume that the dynamics of the Corruption Perceptions Index
(CPI)22–24 approximates the dynamics of GCI. Thus for European
countries GCI versus CPI follows a power law with a slope 3.17 (t-
value 13.1) with a correlation coefficient of 0.90.
Figure 4(b) shows the 2011 CPI versus the 2011 gdp for the EU
countries. Because corruption strongly affects a country’s prospects
for improvement in its wealth rank over a decade (Fig. 3), we next
study how corruption changes over time. Figure 4(c) shows a pdf of
changes in CPI rank over the period 2001–2011 for 91 countries. In
agreement with Fig. 3, which shows the rank of country’s wealth,
Fig. 4(c) shows that it is improbable that a country will rapidly
improve its corruption rank. Again we approximate the pdf of
changes in CPI rank with an exponential function and obtain the
exponent k 5 0.13, similar to the exponent we found in Fig. 3, im-
plying that the dynamics of gdp and the dynamics of CPI may share
the same origin.
Figure 4(c) shows that during the period 2001–2011 the largest
decreases in CPI rank among the EU countries occurred in Italy
(from rank 29 to 45) and in Greece (from rank 42 to 51). In Italy
the CPI decreased from 5.2 to 3.9, in Greece from 4.2 to 3.4, in Spain
from 7.1 to 6.2, and, surprisingly, in the UK from 8.7 to 7.8. The
largest increase in CPI occurred in Poland (from 4.0 to 5.5), Estonia
(from 5.6 to 6.4), and Germany (from 7.3 to 8.0). During the last
decade, the CPI values of the majority of the EU countries changed
only slightly. A change in nation’s mentality in this regard appears to
be another rare event. It is not surprising that the countries with the
sharpest drops in CPI, e.g., Greece and Italy, now face the most
dangerous public debt crises. This is important information for fi-
nancial institutions, since such countries—those with a sharp drop in
CPI—become increasingly risky financially over time.
Finally, to relate indebtedness and competitiveness, Fig. 5 shows
for 2011 total exports (both goods and services)25 versus total public
debt26, both calculated as a percentage relative to a country’s GDP.
Clearly, the total export over GDP may be considered another mea-
sure of a nation’s competitiveness. Note that most of the Mediter-
ranean countries are characterized by a very small total export relative
to GDP, which means that they are generally not very competitive.
Some of them, e.g., Greece and Italy, are also highly indebted.
Figure 2 | Good to be better than the average during an economic
downturn 2008–2011. Themore positive the relative competitivenessD of
Eq. (2), the larger gdp growth rate for the given period.
Figure 3 | Predictive power of dynamical ranking approach: Probability
that a country increases (DR , 0) or decreases (DR . 0) its wealth
quantified by its per capita GDP (gdp) rank within a 10-year period. Pdf
follows an exponential distribution obtained by maximum likelihood
approach with decay constant 0.12.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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Modeling political corruption.Many factors such as education, tech-
nological progress, macroeconomic stability, good governance, busi-
ness firm sophistication, and market efficiency affect productivity and
competitiveness2–9,27–33. Here we focus on how political corruption
affects the growth of a country’s wealth34.
Suppose an imaginary country has only public sector jobs and that
there are only two of them: butchers and neurosurgeons. Having the
butchers butcher and the neurosurgeons perform neurosurgery is
clearly more efficient than vice versa. In our simplified modeling
of political corruption as an aspect of GCI, each country is of the
same size but the more developed countries have a highly educated
and skilled population. Our model is partially influenced by job-
matching models for the private sector35,36. In our model, each coun-
try has jobs Xi taken from a Poisson distribution that is characterized
by a single parameter m where, for example, the USA has a larger m
thanAlbania. In a country with no political corruption [see Fig. 6(a)],
the labor force is optimally distributed, i.e., a worker with skills xi
occupies an optimal job Xi, where xi 5 Xi, and this holds for every i.
In a corrupt country [see Fig. 6(b)], people are often given public
sector jobs because of political corruption, nepotism, and bribery, not
because they have the skills. Thus countries with political corruption
are not as efficient in terms of per capita GDP as countries without
corruption.
To model political corruption and nepotism in the public sector
(see Fig. 1), we assume that at each time i a new job, Xi is created,
taken from a Poisson distribution, where the larger the Poisson vari-
able Xi, the more skilled the labor required by the position. Thus job
Xi can be held by a worker where xi 5 Xi (he/she is qualified), where
xi.Xi (over-qualified), and alsowhere xi,Xi (under-qualified).We
assume that the cases xi. Xi and xi, Xi are less than optimal, i.e., xi
5 Xi. It is clear that when xi , Xi (the under-qualified case) the
worker will not be as effective as when xi 5 Xi, but also that when
xi . Xi the worker will lack motivation and be less efficient.
Specifically, we assume that each worker xi in the public sector works
at a job Xi where there is a discrepancy (xi ? Xi) controlled by a
Gaussian distribution centered atXiwith a standard deviation s. This
choice of mean (Xi) allows that, when s 5 0 and the country has no
corruption, for each i, xi 5 Xi (see Fig. 6), and workers will be
optimally distributed to jobs. As s increases, political corruption
increases. For each i, there is a discrepancy given by
di~ exp { xi{Xij jð Þ, ð4Þ
and this functional dependence value allows di [0,1]. Utilizing
Ref.[34,37], the total discrepancy in the group with N agents is
E~SNi~1di: ð5Þ
The entire group produces output (GDP) as a function of E, where
we assume
GDP~m E, ð6Þ
where gdp 5 GDP/N and m comes from the Poisson distribution of
jobs Xi introduced above. Note that for a country with no corrup-
tion—s5 0, implying di 5 0 for each i—Eqs. (4) and (5) yield E5N,
and Eq. (6) yields maximumGDP.We introduce m in Eq. (6) because
if we compare a country with no corruption but with badly educated
and unskilled citizens with m1 with a country with no corruption but
with very educated and highly skilled citizens with m2, where m1, m2,
it must hold that GDP1,GDP2. Note that Eq. (6) in our framework
relates the country wealth, the educational and skills level, and the
corruption level, quantified by GDP, m and E respectively.
We assume that different countries will differ in skill levels m
according to a Poisson distribution and in corruption levels quan-
tified by s of a Gaussian distribution. Figure 7 shows 1000 countries
each with 10,000 jobs where m ranges from 5 to 20, and s from 0.5 to
20, both taken from uniform distributions. Note that GCI is defined
such that, as it increases, corruption in a given country decreases1.
We define a theoretical GCI as GCIth 5 s2c. With this expression in
which c 5 0.1, we obtain a power-law dependence between GCIth
Figure 4 | Quantifying the Interplay of the Competitiveness, Corruption,
and Growth of a Country. We show (a) a pdf of change in GCI rank
between 2005 and 2011 for 124 countries for which the data we have in this
range; (b) corruption relative to country’s wealth for EUmembers including
Croatia that will join EU in 2013; (c) pdf of change in CPI rank for 91
countries for which the data we have in 2001. We show that the decay
constant c of the change in GCI rank and k of the change in CPI rank are in
agreement with the decay constant in Fig. 3. Pdfs in (a) and (c)
approximately follow exponential distributions obtained by maximum
likelihood approach. In (b) Israel is shown but does not contribute to the fit.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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and gdp, similar to the one obtained in Fig. 1. As GCIth increases, gdp
also increases. Clearly, by tuning parameter c in GCIth 5 1/sc, we can
obtain any slope between GCIth and gdp we want.
Note that in order tomodel Fig. 3, we should assume that the m and
s of different countries change over time. Also note that here we have
modeled only the public sector and its contribution to GDP, but we
could have easily included the private sector in our analysis. For
example, Jovanovic38 has proposed a theory of selection in which
the key is firm efficiency and how it affects firm growth.
Discussion
What can policymakers do to substantially increase their country’s
wealth? It was reported that institutional integrity strongly affects
competitiveness and growth39. In addition, government attitudes
toward markets and freedoms and the efficiency of its operations
are also very important: excessive bureaucracy, over-regulation, cor-
ruption, dishonesty in dealing with public contracts, and political
dependence of the judicial system impose significant economic costs
to businesses and slow the process of economic development1.
Potential investors are also unwilling to invest if their rights as own-
ers are not properly protected. Furthermore, the extent of central-
ization of a givenmarket in both the public and private sectors greatly
impacts the competitiveness and economic development within a
Figure 6 | Model cases of political corruption where jobs are
characterized by different level of skills. (a) Political corruption does not
exist, since a person with skills xi occupies an optimal position Xi, where xi
5 Xi. In contrast, in (b) political corruption exists since generally xi? Xi.
Job place Xi can be occupied by either over-qualified (xi . Xi) or under-
qualified (xi , Xi) person.
Figure 7 | Modeling how well a society is organized quantified by
parameter s. Model simulations for GCIth vs. model GDP. We define
theoretical CPI as GCIth; 1/sc. By varying c we change the slope between
GCIth and gdp.
Figure 5 | Total export versus public debt, both as a percentage of GDP. We fit the plot with a power law and obtain exponent 20.30 6 0.14.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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given country. Thus a highly centralized private market can be as
problematic as a highly centralized public sector.
Figure 3 shows that it is highly improbable that a country will
experience a substantial increase in its wealth. There are many rea-
sons for this40. One of the most important is that to experience a
substantial increase in wealth a nation must change its collective
behavior. It must, for example, reduce its levels of nepotism and
corruption [see Fig. 4(b)]. We might imagine a country in which
all citizens are equally educated and equally skilled. In such a case,
political corruption would not affect growth. In real-world corrupt
countries, however, we can assume that the less-skilled job holders
are more politically connected than the more-skilled job holders.
Political corruption and nepotism can also account for the difference
in effectiveness between public and private sectors, because in cor-
rupt countries many of the public sector jobs are held by those who
are politically connected, irrespective of their qualifications—a
majority of political party members hold public sector jobs they
would not have if they were not party members. An ineffective public
sector often generates an increase in public debt and, as the public
debt level increases, the government must consider raising taxes.
Raising taxes then can substantially affect the economy’s competi-
tiveness. Thus a country’s level of corruption can determine how the
country is organized and how efficient its government is, which, in
turn, affects the private sector that pays the government’s bills.
Interdependent groups of countries such as the EU seem to be
more vulnerable to financial fluctuations than independent single
countries, a finding that is agreement with recent studies of inter-
dependent networks41–45. Recently, in order to increase the competi-
tiveness of the EU and reduce its financial vulnerability, many EU
politicians have been advocating not just a continuation of the cur-
rency union, but also the creation of a fiscal union. Before this is
attempted, a common mechanism to control corruption at the EU
level is needed, e.g., an anti-nepotism law. If corruption is allowed to
continue and grow, un-corrupt EU countries will increasingly be
paying the bills of the corrupt. Fighting corruption is thus fighting
for an increase in competitiveness, and thismust be a top EUpriority.
Methods
The World Economic Forum has released the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI),
developed by Sala-i-Martin and Artad, in order to assess the ability of countries to
provide high levels of prosperity for their citizens1. The index quantifies how pro-
ductive a country is as it uses available resources. It measures the microeconomic and
macroeconomic foundations of national competitiveness. GCI is defined as a
weighted average of many different components, each measuring a different aspect of
competitiveness: institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, health,
primary education, goodsmarket efficiency, labor market efficiency, financial market
development, technological readiness (e.g., access to high technology), market size,
business sophistication, and innovation1. It provides a raw score that ranges between
0 and 6, where the later value defines the most competitive country. The 2011–2012
Global Competitiveness Report covers 142 developed and developing economies.
We also analyze the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)22,23 introduced by
Transparency International. The CPI is a composite index based on independent surveys
of business people and on assessments of corruption in different countries provided by
more than ten independent institutions around the world, including the World Econo-
mic Forum, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, and the Economist
Intelligence Unit. The CPI ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly transparent).
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